that a tighter monetary policy might worsen the downturn, but to preserve the gold standard they chose to raise interest rates and allow a contraction of bank reserves.
In this paper, I argue that American officials chose to abandon gold in 1971 because of institutional and ideological changes brought about by the Great Depression. Key changes included a new avenue for monetizing Federal Government debt, a weakening of the Federal Reserve System's insulation from political interference, and a new economic policy ideology that doubted the stability of private markets and prescribed government management of aggregate demand.
The most importantchange for monetary policy stemming from the Great Depression concerned the gold standard. In 1931, FederalReserve officials viewed the gold standard as fundamental to long-run economic prosperity and were willing to defend the system even ifit meant taking actions that would worsen the ongoing depression. In 1971, U.S. economic policy makers no longer viewed the gold standard in this way, and were unwilling to tighten monetary policy to preserve the gold standard, even though the United States had a rising rate of inflation and a growing economy. The choice to abandon Bretton Woods was made, I argue, because the Great Depression had weakened the ideological underpinnings of the gold standard. t During the Depression, the gold standard had failed to preserve prosperity for those countries with even the largest reserve holdings, and suspension proved to be a prerequisite for recovery in most countries (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985) . Although many people continued to view the gold standard and fixed exchange rates positively, most believed that the gold standard required the management ofgovernment officials. Thus, after World War II, the managed gold Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) examine institutional changes to U.S. monetary policy making resulting from the Great Depression, and argue that those affecting the gold standard were the most important. That paper focuses on Federal Reserve policy during in particular, and during the l950s and 1960s generally. By contrast, the present paper examines in much greater detail the policy record leading up to suspension of gold payments in 1971, and how it compares with Federal Reserve policy during the Great Depression. standard of Bretton Woods supplanted the pre-war gold standard. Under Bretton Woods, the United States was able to run an inflationary monetary policy without the swift discipline of gold outflows. The initial impetus for inflation resulted from other changes --increased political pressure on the Fed and attempts to stimulate output by increasing aggregate demand, for example, as well as from flaws in the Fed's basic operating strategy. But under Bretton Woods, inflation could gather substantial momentum before policy makers were forced to confront the consequences of their policies. In the face of a hemorrhagingbalance of payments deficit and no strong ideological attachment to gold, Bretton Woods collapsed and external constraints on domestic monetary policy were abandoned. This paper begins with an overview of monetary policy during the Great Depression. By many, though not all, possible measures, monetary policy was exceptionally contractionary during 1929-33, and I examine why the Fed pursued such a policy during this period. Next, I
identify and discuss key institutional changes to the monetary policy environment that resulted directly from the Great Depression. I argue that these changes help explain the inflation bias of the Fed's post-World War II monetary policy. Finally, I describe the Federal Reserve's response, or lack thereof, to the growing balance of payments deficits leading up to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and how the decision to abandon gold in 1971 was a legacy of the Great Depression.
Monetary Policy in the First Phase ofthe Great Depression
By almost any measure, monetary policy during 1929-33 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by one-third, ex post real interest rates reached double-digits, and banks failed by the thousands (see Table 1 ). How could the Fed have let this happen?
The explanations for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during the Great Depression largely fall into two categories. One attributes policy failures to innocentmistakes or neglect, 4/14/97 4 while the other contends that the Fed willfully engineered contractionary monetary policy to foster bureaucratic objectives, or in response to interest group pressure. Although some political scientists and public choice economists favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein and Ferguson, 1984; Anderson, et al., 1988) , most economists and economic historians blame the Fed's policy on misguided policy rules, as well as on petty jealousies that limited the Fed's ability to respond decisively to rapidly changing conditions.
The most prominent explanation of Federal Reserve behavior during the Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , who argue that a distinct shift in policy occurred with the death in 1928 ofBenjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Like Fisher (1935) before them, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contendthat Strong understood how to employ the tools of monetary policy to minimize cyclical fluctuations in output and prices and to prevent or limit financial panics. His death created a void of both leadership and understanding which left the Fed unresponsive to financial crises, bank runs, and their contractionary effects. Under Strong's leadership, the Fed had used the tools at its disposal to pursue both domestic and international objectives (Wheelock, 1991) . Large open-market purchases and discount rate reductions in 1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic economic growth and to enable Great Britain to attract gold reserves (by lowering U.S. interest rates relative to those in Britain). Open-market sales and discount rate hikes in 1928-29, on the other hand, were intended to discourage stock market speculation, which at least some Fed officials viewed as a manifestation of inflation.
On the surface, the Fed seems to have been less responsive to the Depression than it had been to earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns. Table 2 This fact, along with the occurrence of banking panics and sharp declines in the money stock and price level during 1929-31, lead Friedman and Schwartz (1963) to conclude that the intent and implementation of monetary policy during the Great Depression were dramatically different than they had been in 1924 or 1927.2 Despite the Fed's weak response to the Depression, some researchers argue that policy changed little, if at all, with Benjamin Strong's death (e.g., Wicker, 1966; Brunner and Meltzer, 1968; Wheelock, 1991) . During the Depression, the Fed used borrowed reserves (discount window loans) and market interest rates as policy guides. 3 When member banks borrowed relatively little from the Federal Reserve discount window or market interest rates were unusually low, Fed officials interpreted monetary conditions as "easy." Conversely, high levels 2 Wheelock (1991) presents econometric estimates of the Federal Reserve "reaction function" for [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] . Simulations of this function also illustrate that the Fed made fewer open-market purchases and cut its discount rate less during 1929-31 thanit would have done under the pre-1929 reaction function. But, as discussed below, this does not necessarily imply that the policy regime, i.e., the Fed's objectives or strategy, had changed.
The use ofopen-market operations for objectives other thanto secure earning assets evolved in the early l920s, but their use to manipulate instruments or operating targets, such as borrowed reserves, evolved only gradually as the Fed gained experience. Well into the Depression, the directions to the Fed's trading desk from the Open Market Committee specified the dollar amounts of securities the desk was authorized to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at Open Market Committee meetings turned more toward the desired level of excess reserves, and focused less on the specific dollar volume ofsecurities to buy or sell. Later in the '30s, the Committee targeted yields on Treasury securities, as well as excess reserves. of borrowed reserves or high interest rates signaled that money was "tight." Once the Depression began, both borrowed reserves and interest rates fell sharply and generally remained low, giving Fed officials the impression that money was plentiful and "cheap."
The Fed's use of discount window borrowing and interest rates as policy guides during the Depression appears consistent with the policy framework that Benjamin Strong had outlined when he was running the Fed. Speaking to Federal Reserve officials in 1926, for example, Strong described his rule of thumb for determining how to use open-market policy during a recession:
Should we go into a business recession while the member banks were continuing to borrow directly 500 or 600 million dollars ... we should consider taking steps to relieve some ofthe pressure which this borrowing induces by purchasing government securities and thus enabling member banks to reduce their indebtedness....
As a guide to the timing and extent ofany [open-market] purchases which might appeardesirable, one ofourbest guides would be theamount of borrowing by member banks in principal centers.... Our experience has shown that when New York City banks are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 million dollars or more, there is then some real pressure for reducing loans, and money rates tend to be markedly higher than the discount rate.... When memberbanks are owing us about 50 million dollars or less the situation appears to be comfortable, with no marked pressure for liquidation. (quoted by Chandler, 1958, pp. 239- Table 2 ). Similarly, money market interest rates were unusually low in 1930-31. Thus, by Strong's measures, the stance of monetary policy in 1930-31 appears to have been quite easy. Policy makers inferredthat there was little more the Fed could, or should, do, and that it was now up, to the economy to respond.
As Strong (1926, p. 468) had said on another occasion, "The Reserve Banks do not push credit into use" (emphasis in original).
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Many economists have noted that rigid use of borrowed reserves or interest rates as policy instruments will cause the money supply to rise and fall procyclically becauseborrowed reserves and interest rates tend to vary positively with economic activity. Moreover, the banking crises of 1929-33 made borrowed reserves an especially poor indicator of monetary conditions during the Depression because a fear of runs made banks especially reluctant to suggest any weakness to depositors, which discount-window borrowing might do (Wheelock, 1991) .
Although a few System officials questioned the reliability of borrowed reserves as a policy guide during the Depression, the prevailing view was that monetary conditions were exceptionally easy, and that the economy's failure to expand was not the fault of monetary policy. We cannot On the surface, the Fed's behavior in the fourth quarter of 1931 appears inconsistent both with Benjamin Strong's policy guidelines and with appropriate lender of last resort policy. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 3 15-22) describe, the Fed had acted to halt an "external drain" ofreserves from the banking system (gold outflows), but not the "internal drain" (conversionof deposits into currency).
This refers to the discount rate of the FederalReserve Bank of New York. By December, the discount rates of all twelve Reserve Banks were at 3.5 percent or higher. The Fed also augmented bank reserves by purchasing bankers acceptances from member banks. The Fed purchased all eligible acceptances offered by banks but, as with its discount rate, the Fed increased the interest rate atwhich it made these purchases. Bank note issues. Consequently, the Fed's "freegold," i.e., the amount of gold not currently pledged as reserves or collateral, dwindled.
In its 1932 Annual Report, the Federal Reserve Board implied that a lack of free gold reserves had kept it from purchasing government securities during the 1931 crisis, and noted that large purchases had followed enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of February 27, 1932, which had expanded the types of securities that were eligible for use as collateral for Fed liabilities to Whereas Fed holdings of government securities could not serve as collateral, discount window loans always produced collateral, including those secured by commercial bank holdings of government securities.
include U.S. Government securities (see also the FederalReserve Bulletin, March 1932). Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 399-406) contend that the Fed's claim that a lack of free gold had prevented open-market purchases was a ruse, though others, such as Epstein and Ferguson (1984, pp. 964-65) argue that Fed officials truly felt constrained by a lack of reserves.
Regardless of whether or not the Fed was constrained by its collateral requirement, the System had anotheroption --the Federal Reserve Board had the right to suspend the Fed's reserve requirements. I am aware of no evidence that the Fed considered suspension, however. Wicker (1966, pp. 169-70) Fed officials believed strongly in preserving the gold standard and at first glance their policy actions appear to have reflected gold standard doctrine. But, two aspects of policy --the Fed's delay in raising its discount rate following Britain's suspension of the gold standard, and the Fed's long-time policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on the domestic money supply --suggest otherwise. Wicker (1996, pp. 86-94) argues that the gold standard played only a "minor" role in the discount rate increases of October 1931, citing the fact that the discount rate was not increased until two and one-half weeks after Britain suspended gold payments and the United States had experienced heavy gold outflows. As further evidence, he cites meeting records of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York in which George Harrison, Governor of the New York Fed, argued against raising rates in the wake ofBritain's action, and then buried defense of gold among other reasons when later advocating a discount rate increase. Wicker argues that the Fed's policy was thus not a "knee-jerk" response to gold standard conventions. Chandler (1971, p. 177) interprets the Fed's delay in raising its discount rate somewhat differently. He argues that some Fed officials believed that a discount rate increase might suggest weakness and thereby exacerbate gold outflows, though fear that a rate increase might hurt the economy also played some part in the delay. Moreover, other Federal Reserve policy makers did press for an immediate discount rate increase to defend the gold standard. Fed Governor Eugene Meyer, for example, argued that "an advance in the rate was called for by every known rule, and ... foreigners would regard it as a lack ofcourage ifthe rate were not advanced" (quoted by Wicker, 1996, p. 93) . Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 383 ) cite a memorandum prepared for a meeting ofthe Fed's Open Market Committee in November 1931 which concluded that the "foreign and domestic drains upon bank reserves were met in the classic way by increases in the discount rate combined with a policy of free lending." Although disputing the memo's conclusion regarding the policy's efficacy, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) agree that the Fed had sought to maintain the gold standard.
Besides the delay in raising the discount rate in 1931, the Fed's long-standing policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on the domestic money stock also suggests that the Fed was not fully committed to the gold standard. Gold standard doctrine (the "rules of the game") held that gold inflows (outflows) should be permitted to increase (decrease) a country's money stock and price level so as to induce shifts in capital flows and the balance of trade that would limit future gold movements. 6 Since the early l920s, however, the Fed had largely offset reserve fluctuations caused by flows of gold, currency and other sourcesby varying the quantity of reserves supplied 6 See Eichengreen (1992) or Temin (1989) for detail about the operation of the international gold standard and its role in the Great Depression.
by open-market operations and discount window lending. In essence, the Fed "sterilized" gold flows, as Benjamin Strong explained in 1926: In the old days there was a direct relation between the country's stock of gold, bank deposits and the price level because bank deposits were ... based on the stock of gold and bore a constant relationship to the gold stock.... But in recent years the relationship between gold and bank deposits is no longer as close or direct ... because the Federal Reserve System has given elasticity to the country's bank reserves.... Federal Reserve bank credit is an elastic buffer between the country's gold supply and bank credit. (Strong, 1926, p. 470) Moreover, Strong credited the Fed with preventing inflation by offsetting gold inflows in 1921 and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into the United States in 1921 and 1922, many economists abroad, and in this country as well, expected this inward flow of gold would result in a huge credit expansion and a serious price inflation. That no such expansion or inflation has taken place is due to the fact that the amount of Federal Reserve credit in use was diminished as gold imports continued. Thus ... the presence of the Reserve System may be said to have prevented rather than fostered inflation. (Strong, 1926, p. 471) .
Although the Fed generally sterilized gold flows, it proved willing to deviate from that policy when it seemed necessary to protect the gold standard. The easing of monetary policy in 1924 and 1927 seems at least partly motivated by a desire to repel gold inflows, and thereby assist Britain's ability to maintain gold reserves (Wicker, 1966; Wheelock, 1991) . Moreover, when gold outflows reduced the Fed's reserve ratio in 1920-21, the Fed increased its discount rate to 7 percent (a level not reached again until 1973) and endured a sharp deflation in order to preserve its gold reserve. This episode demonstrated the Fed's resolve to maintain its gold reserve and set the precedent for its policy in late 1931. Benjamin Strong may have "discovered" and actively used open-market policy, but he was unwilling to conduct policy outside the framework of the gold standard. He testified in 1928 that When you are speaking of efforts simply to stabilize commerce, industry, agriculture, employment and so on, without regard to the penalties of violation of the gold standard, you are talking about human judgment and the management of prices which I do not believe in at all. (Quoted by Burgess, 1930, pp. 331) . The year 1932 markedthe beginning of a series of institutional reforms with potentially large consequences for monetary policy (see Table 3 ). Among the most significant were the Although he lent his name to the enabling legislation, Carter Glass, who had sponsored the This section draws heavily on Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) , where additional detail can be found. During World War I, the Fed lent reserves to banks against their holdings ofU.S. Government securities at a discount ratethat guaranteed banks a profit on their security holdings. This also had the effect of monetizing government debt.
original Federal Reserve Act, apparently voiced considerable worry about the inflationary potential of permitting government obligations to serve as collateral for Federal Reserve notes (Chandler 1971, p. 189) . I argue below that Glass was prescient in his concerns. 9
The next institutional change came when President Franklin Roosevelt suspended the gold standard upon taking office in March 1933. Roosevelt was willing --perhaps forced --to take the step that Federal Reserve officials had so feared. As in other countries, economic recovery followed suspension and thereby gave credibility to a regime of "managed money" (see Eichengreen, 1992 or Temin, 1989 ).
Using authority granted by the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934, Roosevelt fixed the value of gold at $35 per ounce (the previous level had been $20.67). Although the ownership of gold and its use for domestic payments remained prohibited, the United States returned to the gold standard for the settlement of payments with other countries that also were on the gold standard. The restored gold standard, however, differed fundamentally from the previous standard in the degree to which its operation was removed from private markets and placed under control of government authorities. Americans were forbidden from holding gold, gold clauses in private contracts were made illegal, and the Treasury would sell gold only for making foreign payments.
Gold also was no longer regarded as an absolute exogenous check on government manipulation of the supply of money. Under the weight of the Great Depression, the ideology of the gold standard, which viewed gold as fundamental to a country's economic prosperity, had cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was weakened and, perhaps more The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 was originally set to expire after one year, but was made permanent in 1933. It should not be confused with the Banking Act of 1933 which, among other things, established Federal deposit insurance, separated commercial and investment banking, and outlawed the payment of interest on demand deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 is also sometimes referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act.
importantly, government authorities had demonstrated a willingness to manipulate the gold standard to limit the extent to which it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy.
Thereafter, when the Fed's gold reserve requirement threatened to limit money supply growth, the reserve requirements were reduced and ultimately eliminated with apparently little debate or fanfare. The gold standard as it existed after 1933 was thus fundamentally different from its precursor, and foreshadowed the Bretton Woods gold standard that was to replace it after World War II.
In addition to marking a fundamental shift in the degree to which gold served as a Between 1933 and 1938, the Treasury purchased 1.8 billion ounces of silver, thereby increasing bank reserves by $1 billion (some 20 percent of the total increase in reserves during the period).
Had the President chosen to devalue the dollar in terms of silver, the Treasury would have reaped a $2.2 billion windfall on its silver holdings (Johnson 1939, pp. 195-98) . In summarizing the various new authorities given the Administration, Johnson (1939, p. 202) concludes, "The President could double or triple bank reserves, had complete discretion over the gold value--and consequently the foreign exchange value--of the dollar, and could establish bimetallismby proclamation, in other words, he could completely refashion the monetary system of the country, and the sole criteria required were his own subjective evaluations of the situation."
Organizational changes to the Federal Reserve System may have also contributed to the See Bordo (1993) or Solomon (1977) for a history of the Bretton Woods System, and Meltzer (1991) for more specific analysis of U.S. economic policy under Bretton Woods. as its interwar predecessor had been. However, the mechanism of dollar convertibility under Bretton Woods was fundamentally different from the mechanism of the pre-Great Depression gold standard, and the new mechanism explains how the United States could conductan inflationary monetary policy while maintaining a fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold.
Unlike the gold standard as it existed before 1933, under the Bretton Woods System, the balance ofpayments could exertmonetary discipline only to the extent permitted by central banks themselves. This mechanism reflected a fundamental shift in ideology, from one that saw maintaining gold convertibility as paramount for long-run prosperity, to an ideology that viewed fixed exchange rates and gold convertibility as desirable, but not so important as to sacrifice short-run economic stability in defense of the international system. Discretionary monetary policy --"managed money" --was permitted under Bretton Woods to a degree never before States increased rapidly, while American gold reserves dwindled (see Figure 1) . " The United 12 Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woods represented just one of a series of steps away from a gold standard operatedsolely by private markets, with little or no government interference, to a flat monetary regime. As noted above, under the interwar gold-exchange standard the Federal Reserve (and other central banks) sterilized gold flows and used open-market operations and discount rate policy to manipulate gold flows. '~The data sources for Figure 1 
are The Role ofGold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems:

Report to the Congress ofthe Commission on the Role ofGold in the Domestic and International Monetary
Systems, Volume 1, Table SC-10, column 3 (U.S. monetary gold stock) and Table SC-8, columns I and 2 States' commitment to gold convertibility thus became less and less credible. Numerous remedies other than a substantial tightening of monetary policy were attempted to improve the U.S. payments deficit. But, without addressing the fundamental problem, the Bretton Woods System was destined to collapse, which it did when President Nixon closed the gold window on The operating framework of Federal Reserve policy in the 1950s and 1960s was much like that which Benjamin Strong had described in the 1920s. That strategy was flawed because it permitted destabilizing fluctuations in the supply of money. I believe this helps explain why Fed officials were able to convince themselves that their policies were promoting recovery from the Depression when in fact they were permitting a contractionary decline in the money stock (Wheelock, 1991) . Similarly, the Fed's use of this operating strategy in the 1960s explains how Fed officials could argue that policy was "leaning against the wind" of inflation despite accelerating money supply growth.
The Fed's interwar-era policy strategy, and its post-Accord reincarnation, focused on the levels of market interest rates and the net borrowed, or "free," reserves of commercial banks.
Fed officials engaged in open-market operations to alter the level of free reserves, which equals
the difference between reserves that banks hold in excess of legal requirements and reserves borrowed from the Fed's discount window. Through free reserves, the Fed sought to manipulate money market interest rates (Treasury bill yields in the early 1 960s, the federal funds rate later on). Open-market purchases (sales) tend to add to (subtract from) the stock of free reserves, and an increase (decrease) in free reserves was viewed as an easing (tightening) of policy. The level of free reserves is plotted alongside the rate of inflation for the period from the Accord (March Figure 3 . The Fed tended to reduce free reserves to combat increases in inflation, and increase free reserves when inflation was declining. Thus Fed officials sought to contract the level of free reserves in response to the generally rising rate of inflation ofthe 1960s. Because market interest rates tended to rise, Fed officials were further convinced that policy was tight.
1951) through December 1971 in
Many economists, especially monetarists, criticized the Fed's policy strategy because of its tendency to exacerbate swings in money supply growth.' 6 As illustrated in Figure 4 , money supply growth accelerated throughout much of the 1960s, even as Fed officials ratcheted down the level of free reserves. The evidence therefore does not indicate that Fed officials lacked concern for inflation or failed to attempt to check the rising price level. Nevertheless, the Fed's policy permitted the money supply to rise at an inflationary rate.
The Federal Reserve was not powerless to halt the rising inflation, and Fed officials understood that inflation was contributing to the American balance of payments deficit and threatening the gold standard. Still, under the Bretton Woods System, U.S. policy makers did not have to make price stability the sole, or even primary, objective of monetary policy as long as other countries were willing to hold the growing supply of dollars available on world markets.
Foreign central banks did forbear for a time, particularly since the dollar was the key currency of the international payments system. This gave the United States breathing room --not, as it turned out, to correct its balance of payments deficit, but to pursue other policy goals while inflation worsened and the collapse of Bretton Woods became inevitable.
The Monetary Policy Legacy of the Great Depression
The Federal Reserve stumbled into an inflationary monetary policy in the early 1 960s because, absent discipline exerted by balance of payments deficits, policy makers were able to pursue other objectives, namely employment growth and low interest rates on government debt.
With its focus on free reserves and interest rates, the Fed's operating framework tended to cause money supply growth to accelerate at an inflationary pace as economic activity expanded.
Because the Fed had used much the same operating framework before the Depression, this cause of inflationary policy during the 1960s was not a result of the Depression having occurred.
Keynesian Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy Making
Much of the "inflationary bias" in monetary policy during the 1960s can, however, be attributed to changed institutions and economic policy ideology caused by the Great Depression.
Keynesian macroeconomics and its influence on economic policy making was an important ideological product of the Great Depression. The influence of Keynesian economic ideas on policy making during the 1960s has received considerable attention (e.g., DeLong, 1995), with Lucas (1980, p. 704) writing that one of the "main features of the Keynesian Revolution and the neoclassical synthesis into which it evolved in the United States ...
[was] the onset of the Great Depression and the consequent shift of attention from explaining a recurrentpattern of ups and downs to explaining an economy apparently stuck in an interminable down."
Keynesian-oriented policy makers believed that monetary and fiscal policy could reliably increase aggregate demand and employment along a stable Phillips curve. Central to discussions of monetary policy among Federal Reserve officials was the perceived tradeoff of unemployment and inflation. As Federal Reserve Governor Sherman Maisel explained it, "There is a trade-off between idle men and a more stable value for the dollar. A conscious decision must be made as to how much unemployment and loss of output must be made in order to get smaller price rises" (Maisel, 1973, p. 14) . Maisel added "that at least some of the Committee's differences on policy reflected differences in basic value judgments regarding the relative importance of various conflicting goals --for example, regarding the appropriate trade-off between employment and price stability" (FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41 Burns and other Fed officials frequently argued that monetary policy could not effectively control inflation, but that fiscal policy and wage and price controls could better accomplish the task. Monetary policy, on the other hand, should prevent interest rates from rising and choking offeconomic growth. In arguing against a policy tightening in April 1971, Burns contended that any increase in long-term interest rates would slow the economy "and the nation might then enter on a long period ofeconomic stagnation. The Federal Reserve could not permit that development" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56) .
During the l960s and 1970s, Fed officials believed that policy actions to push down interest rates could promote output and employment growth. Such action would not necessarily cause inflation, they argued, and if it did, inflation was an acceptable cost of high employment.
Moreover, wage and price controls could limit inflation. It is my view that Federal Reserve policy makers were no less concerned about the unemployed and the prospects for economic growth during the Great Depression. Their views about how monetary policy could be used to foster growth, however, were almost diametrically opposed to those of Fed officials in the 1 960s and early 1 970s.
In the Depression, a common view among Fed officials was that pumping liquidity into the economy would only prolong the Depression by delaying the adjustments to wages and prices that they saw as necessary for a recovery to begin. One example of this point of view is I cannot see how the situation can be benefited by putting fifty millions of dollars, or, in fact, any other amount, into the general market at this time.... The reason that more money is not being used is because it is not needed, and when there is already sufficient money to meet the expressed needs, it seems to me unwise artificially to add to the amount already sufficient ... because based on a redundancy of money rather than on actual needs may be hazardous. (quoted by Chandler, 1971, p. 142) A similar view was expressed by George Norris, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia:
We believe that the correction must come about through reduced production, reduced inventories, the gradual reduction of consumer credit, the liquidation of security loans, and the accumulation of savings through the exercise of thrift.... We have been putting out credit in a period of depression, when it was not wanted and could not be used. (quoted by Chandler, 1971, p. 137) .
The Governor ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, John Calkins, also argued against trying to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates: "With credit cheap and redundant we do not believe that business recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper and more redundant" (quoted by Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 372) .
The views of Martin, Norris and Calkins were not atypical among Federal Reserve officials during the 1930s. Nor was it unusual for government officials outside of the Federal Reserve to hold similar views. Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, for example, believed that the best medicine for the Depression was to "Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate ... purge the rottenness out ofthe system" (quoted by Eichengreen, 1992, p. 251) . Such a prescription could hardly be called "Keynesian."
Political Pressures on the Fed
The macroeconomic model used by Federal Reserve officials during the 1960s and l970s was quite different from that used in the early 1930s. So too was the extent to which the Federal Reserve was pressured by other government officials.
Although the Federal Reserve has never been a truly "independent" central bank, certain institutional changes occurring as a result of the Great Depression subjected the Fed to greater political pressure, while at the same time increasing the opportunity for the Fed to monetize fiscal deficits. Together these changes added an inflation bias to monetary policy.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, as noted previously, permitted U.S. Government securities to serve as partial backing for Federal Reserve monetary liabilities. Thus monetization of fiscal deficits could occur even ifthe Fed held no excess gold or commercial paper reserves.
In the 1930s, special authorities given by Congress to the President to fix the value of the dollar in terms of gold, to monetize silver, to buy and sell foreign exchange and even to order the who are presidential appointees. Political influence on monetary policy has been the subject of extensive study (e.g., Wooley, 1984; Havrilesky, 1993) , and a general conclusion seems to be that the short, finite horizon of political election cycles gives politicians an incentive to favor more expansionary monetary policies than does the public as a whole. To the extent that politicians are able to get the monetary policy they desire, the result is a higher long-run rate of inflation than would otherwise occur. Thus countries with less independent central banks tend to have higher inflation rates than countries with relatively independent central banks.
An infamous example of Federal Reserve acquiescence to political pressure came in 1972 when at the request ofthe Administration Arthur Burns was alleged to have increased the money supply growth rate to promote President Nixon's reelection (see Wells, 1994 for Evidence of this is given in Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) . Although the Bretton Woods System provided some insulation for discretionary monetary policy, Federal Reserve officials understood that the United States could not run a balance of payments deficit indefinitely. But, Fed officials were also wary of combating a balance of payments deficit with policies that might interfere with other goals. On one occasion,°B urns had a close relationship with Nixon and clearly understood the monetary policy desired by the Administration. Two examples ofthe interjection of political considerations into monetary policy discussions occurred at a meeting of the FOMC in October 1970 and January 1971. On the first occasion, Burns suggested that committee members consider the 'judgments of members ofCongress, senior officials of the Administration, and others" when attempting to determine how high they were willing to let the unemployment rate rise in fighting inflation (FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41) . Three meetings later, Burns told the committee that "The Administration's confidence in the System was weakening as a result ofthe shortfalls that had occurred in the rates of money growth.... The credibility of the Federal Reserve would be greatly strengthened if it became apparentthat the Committee was seeking to make up the ... shortfall" (FOMC Minutes, January 12, 1971, p. 37) . See Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) for examples of political pressure on the Fed when William Martin was Fed chairman. President Alfred Hayes ofthe Federal Reserve Bank of New York, argued that "I would think it unwise to let the gold outflow itself affect our monetary policy directly, i.e., in the way of using a tightening move directed specifically toward stemming the flow and unrelated to domestic economic developments" (FOMC Minutes, November 10, 1958, p. 14-15) . Another time, a
Reserve Bank president expressed concern about the balance ofpayments deficit, but was reluctant to advocate a tighter policy for fear of disrupting the market for government securities:
"Generally, he felt that the course of monetary policy should be moving toward a more restrictive posture. At the same time, he was quite concerned about the rate picture in the government securities market and the problems facing the Treasury in the future" (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 34) . This reluctance to face squarely gold outflows and a balance of payments deficit stands in marked contrast to the Fed's reaction to gold outflows in 1931. At that time, Fed officials agreed that maintaining convertibility of the dollar into gold at a constant price was fundamental to long-run economic stability, and they were willing to tighten monetary policy in the middle of a depression to preserve the international monetary regime. By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed the balance of payments with concern, but were hesitant to make it the sole, or even the primary, focus ofpolicy. This change in philosophy, attaching less importance to the gold standard rule and more to discretionary policy was an important legacy of the Great Depression.
Although Fed officials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to arrest the balance of payments deficit, they did see the deficit as influencing their ability to promote domestic economic activity. Chairman Martin, for example, argued that "If the Federal Reserve got the reputation of following a cheap money policy just for the sake of doing so, people abroad would be encouraged to think the System was not concerned with the balance of payments or the soundness of the dollar" (FOMC Minutes, December 13, 1960, p. 40) . Martin also argued that "The balance of payments problem ... was a vital factor in the unemployment situation. Foreign capital was finding the United States less and less attractive, there were pressures for movement of capital abroad, and this was having a deleterious effect on employment in this country" (FOMC Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 56) .
Fed officials also understood that the balance of payments deficit stemmed from differences in the macroeconomic policies of different countries. At a FOMC meeting in 1959, a Fed staffmember reported that "The net result ofattempts in this country to validate our wage and price policies through monetary expansion could succeed only ifwe could inflate the whole world." The staff member went on to argue that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could "price United States' goods out of world markets" because officials of other countries, notably Germany and The Netherlands, surely would not permit inflation in their domestic prices (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 14) . The same official, however, was unwilling to blame monetary policy alone for the balance of payments deficit. In arguing that gold outflows "call for a generally restrictive credit policy ... more effective corrections ... would be moves to reduce the budgetary deficit and the checking of price rises due to wage and other cost increases" (FOMC Minutes, October 21, 1958) .
The Fed's unwillingness to tighten sufficiently to stem the balance of payments deficit led it to consider other actions it might take. One of the earliest ofthe policies intended to restore external balance was "Operation Twist"--an attempt to raise short-term interest rates high enough to attract foreign capital, while keeping long-term interest rates low enough to favor domestic expansion.
Other policies intendedto correct international payments imbalances without slowing domestic activity included agreements with foreign central banks to forebear from demanding gold, intervention in foreign exchange markets, the issuance of foreign currency-denominated U.S. bonds ("Roosa bonds"), requests of early repayment by foreign governments of debts to the U.S. Government, the removal of interest rate ceilings on U.S. bank time deposits, capital outflow constraints imposed in the United States, and changes in U.S. tax treatment of foreign earnings. Balance of payments deficits continued, however, and the long-term feasibility of the existing dollar gold-exchange standard grew increasingly doubtful.
The Collapse of Bretton Woods
When Arthur Burns took over as chairman of the Fed's Board of Governors in early 1970, the U.S. economy was sliding toward a recession, the inflation rate stood at 6.5 percent (first quarter average annualized rate of CPI inflation), and the U.S. balance of payments had been in deficit nearly every year since the late 1950s. At his first meeting, Burns announced that "in his judgment, economic developments had reached a point at which a rethinking of monetary policy was in order" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 3) . It quickly became apparent that Burns would make avoidance of a recession his first priority. Against three dissents, the Federal OpenMarket Committee voted to ease monetary policy at that meeting. One ofthe dissenting votes came from Andrew Brimmer, who expressed the hope that "the Committee would not lose sight of the highly unfavorable outlook for the balance of payments and would give the payments balance somewhat greater than customary weight in formulating policy over the near term" (ibid, p. 59). Minutes, June 23, 1970) . The balance of payments seems to have had limited impact on FOMC deliberations, however, because after hearing the summary of the European meeting, the Committee would review domestic economic conditions and discuss the policy directive, usually with little or no reference to the balance of payments.
At the FOMC meeting of October 20, 1970, the Fed staff gave a particularly lengthy and pessimistic report on the balance of payment. Following the report, Burns "said he could add one word of reassurance. Work on the balance ofpayments problem was going forward actively, and he was confident that adequate measures for grappling with the problem could be devised" (FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 21) . From this comment, it is clear that Burns viewed the balance ofpayments deficit as a problem that could be controlled effectively without monetary policy action. Moreover, the comment reflects the fact that the Treasury, especially Undersecretary Paul Volker, was taking the lead in devising America's international economic policy.
Despite the seeming lack of influence of the balance of payments deficit on Federal Reserve policy, some of the Fed's staff as well as the occasional governor, warned about the worsening payments deficit. At an FOMC meeting on June 23, 1970, the first vice president of the New York Fed argued that "A convincing and sustained attack on domestic inflation remains essential for improving our balance of payments and strengthening confidence in the dollar" (FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970, p. 57) . On another occasion, Alfred Hayes, President of the New York Fed noted that "a stiffprice is being paid for the easing of money market conditions in the United States.... International conditions underline the need for giving high priority to the inflation problem" (FOMC Minutes, September 15, 1970, pp. 43-44) . But, GovernorMaisel replied that It would be improper to assume that balance ofpayments considerations should be a constraint on [policy] . If the balance of payments remained unsatisfactory with demand still far below normal, that would appear to be an indication of basic structural problems in the balance ofpayments sphere. The Committee should be working to correct those structural imbalances rather than assuming a posture which traded off losses of income, output, and jobs in an attempt to offset basic structural defects in the balance of payments sphere. (ibid. p. 46) Arthur Burns added that "He believed that balance of payments considerations should not prevent the Committee from taking the policy actions it felt required by the domestic economy" (ibid. p. 65). Later in the same meeting Burns advocated "special measures," presumably capital controls or similar measures, to deal with the balance of payments deficit (ibid, p. 81). Burns reiterated this view on February 9, 1971: "Chairman Burns commented that while the System was faced with international as well as domestic problems, the latter were the more pressing.
Moreover, special tools were available for dealing with the former" (FOMC Minutes, February 9, 1971, p. 92).
The balance of payments deficit grew increasingly worse in early 1971, and the Fed's staff warnings became stronger. At the March FOMC meeting, a Fed staff member warned that "Sooner or later -and he suspected that it would be sooner --the central bank complaints now being voiced privately [about their build-up of dollar balances] would become known to the market, which might then decide to protect itself against the risk of a sudden break in the structure of exchange parities" (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, p. 22) . Another staff member reported that 1) the balance of payments deficit in the first two months of this year was enormous; [and] 2) the monetary aggregates have been growing very rapidly.
What connects these two sets of facts is the very steep decline in short-term interest rates. It is not surprising, therefore, that the short-term capital outflow has been extremely large.... Considerable reluctance has been built up abroad, especially among fmancial officials in Europe, over what they regard as an undermining of their own monetary policies resulting from the massive shortterm capital outflows from the United States and from the steep decline in shortterm rates. The impression exists that ... the United States has completely ignored the effects its policies are having on the rest of the world. (ibid, pp. 28-29) As the year 1971 progressed, the international payments crisis worsened. At the FOMC meeting of May 11, New York Fed president Hayes remarked that "We are ... in the midst of an international monetary crisis.... A vote of no confidence in the dollar has been taken by several central banks" (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, p. 53) . Hayes also reported that the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had voted to increase the Bank's discount rate by 1/2 point, the same step taken in response to a flight from the dollar in October 1931:
The directors felt in this major international crisis there was nothing the System could do that would be more useful and more timely than to give an overt signal of our concern and our willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the interest rate spread which was a major cause of the difficulty.... While recognizing the risks involved in a general increase in domestic interest rates, they felt that those risks were outweighed by international conditions. (ibid, pp.
55-56)
The Board of Governors turned down the New York Bank's request for a discount rate increase, citing weakness in the domestic economy, the adverse effects of higher interest rates on the mortgage market and the market for state and local government debt, and the likely instability that a discount rate hike would cause in all financial markets. At the prior FOMC meeting, Burns seem to have predicted the New York Bank's request for a discount rate increase when he relayed that "He had a vivid recollection of developments in 1931, when the Federal Reserve had raised its discount rate and acted to stiffen short-term rates because of a balance of payments problem, and an incipient [domestic economic] recovery had been cut off" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56) . For Burns, the lesson of 1931 was to put the domestic economy first, ahead of the balance ofpayments and preservation of the gold standard.
Conclusion
The failures of economic policy, especially monetary policy, during the Great Depression producedseveral significant institutional and ideological changes in the monetary policy regime. Not surprisingly, because monetary policy was associated with deflation and contraction during 1929-33, the new regime included features that gave policy an inflation bias.
Those features included both a new avenue for monetizing government debt and increased political control of Federal Reserve policy. The Great Depression also put the new economics of Keynes, with its emphasis on government management of aggregate demand, into the professional and policy mainstream.
The most fundamental legacy of the Great Depression for monetary policy, however, concerned the international gold standard. Although governments interfered with the operation of the gold standard before 1933, and an unsettled question among economic historians is the extent to which a laissez-faire' gold standard would have proved more stable, a key lesson taken from the Great Depression was that the international monetary system required active management of government officials. Faith that the gold standard would ensure prosperity was destroyed, as was any notion that a disaster worse than the Depression would result if the gold standard was abandoned. Beginning in 1933, and continuing at least to the 1970s, the dominant ideology was that a gold standard and fixed exchange rates are desirable, but not worth sacrificing high employment to maintain. This change in attitude, and the institutional changes accompanying it, largely explains the inflationary monetary policy of the l960s and early 1970s, as well as the decision to abandon gold and fixed exchange rates in 197 1-73.
Since the l970s, the pendulum has swung away from inflationary monetary policy somewhat. The costs of high inflation and the seeming inability of aggregate demand policy to maintain full employment helped promote New Classical macroeconomics and caused a rethinking ofthe appropriate goals of monetary policy among government officials. Several countries now specify inflation targets for theircentral banks, and have formally adopted price Treasury; amended the president's authority to fix the dollar prices of gold and silver; and established the Exchange Stabilization Fund. Free Reserves (millions of $) 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 Figure 4 Free Reserves and Money Supply Growth 
